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Fenomenologia e disabilità fisica: per una politica del corpo non-normato
Gaining disability among the areas of phenomenological reflection is urgent political action. The aim
of this article is twofold: contributing to the debate about physical disability, from a particular start-
ing point (i.e. themeanings of the real experience) and revealing the structures that socially inform the
bodies in their relationshipswith others. Experiencing physical disabilitymeans living a compromised
body. The compromised lived-body reorganizes, in fact, the experience of space, time, relationship
with the self andwith the others, the knowledge of the world and endures an inequitable and ableistic
socio-cultural organization. In this context, the concept of disappearance is discussed. The compro-
mised body disappears before a norm produced by the able bodies and is excluded from the shared
project of a world-together-with-others. In this sense, the phenomenological reflection could rethink
and support the social participation of people with a physical disability.
Guadagnare la disabilità tra gli ambiti di riflessione della fenomenologia è un’azione politica urgente.
Con questo contributo, si vuole concorrere al dibattito intorno alla disabilità fisica, partendo dai si-
gnificati dell’esperienza concreta e disvelandone le strutture che socialmente informano questi corpi
nelle loro relazioni con gli altri. Vivere la disabilità fisica significa vivere un corpo compromesso che
riordina l’esperienza propriocettiva di spazio, tempo, relazione con il sé e con gli altri, definisce la co-
noscenza del mondo e subisce una ingiusta e abilistica organizzazione sociale e culturale. In questo
ambito, si introduce il concetto di dis-apparenza: il corpo compromesso dis-appare di fronte a norme
prodotte dai corpi abili ed è escluso dal progetto condiviso di un mondo-insieme-con-gli-altri. La ri-
flessione fenomenologica appare, in questo senso, in grado di ripensare e sostenere la partecipazione
sociale delle persone con disabilità fisica.
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1. Introduction
Socrates: Then is life worth living with a wretched and corrupt body?
Crito: Not at all.
(Plato, Crito)
In order to understand how phenomenology may contribute to the debate about disability, it is of
primary importance to define and understand the social impact and consequences of a construct called
ableism (Smith, Foley & Chaney, 2008; Campbell, 2009). By ableism, we mean the set of practices and
attitudes which devalue and limit the potential of people with disabilities (Kattari, Olzman, & Hanna,
2018). Ableism is a form of discriminatory thinking characterized by the belief that people with dis-
abilities are defective, “need to be repaired” or cannot function like the other members of the society
(Castañeda & Peters, 2000). Ableism goes along with disablism, an operative paradigm, conscious or
unconscious, which promotes differential and unequal, sometimes unfair and unethical, treatment of
people with (real or presumed) disabilities. The term “disability” in everyday use refers to characteristics
of the “whole” identity of the people defined as disabled. In this context, disability is a metonymy as it
replaces the indication of a precise and particular disadvantage with the whole person’s deficit. Besides,
the term “body” here is used almost exclusively in its meaning of bearer of a handicap (Paterson and
Hughes, 1999).
People who do not have a disability, who have not experienced a temporary one or who have never
been close with individuals with disabilities, may not understand to what extent the social world is built
around able people, how ableism and disablism affect everyone’s daily life. Turner (1992) defines ours,
a “somatic society”: while the images of bodies have pervaded public andmedia space (beautiful bodies,
healthy bodies, able bodies mostly), one’s body is the field political and cultural activity. The domi-
nant social norms and interpersonal practices lead to exclude the bodies of people with disabilities from
the mainstream of contemporary society or relegating them to “special” areas and places (Paterson &
Hughes, 1999).
In this context, gaining disability among the topics of phenomenological attention is urgent and
politically necessary action. The relationship between pedagogy and phenomenology is not only of a
social and philosophical nature but defines possible future change (Bertolini, 2003). The application of
this type of reasoning is an educational and, at the same time, political activity capable of unravelling the
prejudiced thinking about the disability-related phenomena and fully understanding their structures
(see Lascioli, 2011). Moreover, according to Reynolds (2017a; 2017b), too long disability has been
omitted fromthis philosophical tradition, due to the ableistic conflationofdisabilitywithpain, suffering
and disadvantage. According to this author, the conflation consists of the following:
1. disability is a lack or deprivation;
2. deprivation of potential goods is damage;
3. the damage causes or is a form of pain and suffering.
4. given points 1, 2 and 3, the disability is coextensive with (in the weak version) or causes (in the
strong version) pain and suffering.
Merging disability with lack and deprivation means jeopardizing a phenomenology of disability
(Martiny, 2015), levelling it with the rhetorical paternalism of the norm-gifted subjects. If the gnose-
ological starting point is experience and, particularly, the body (Merleau-Ponty, 2005; Toombs, 1995;
Paterson & Hughes, 1999), the ableistic conflation appears to be wrong and far-fetched. This view
turns out to be not only in stark contrast to the liberal and historicist conceptions of disability (Hughes
& Paterson, 1997; Abrams, 2016) but also a criticism of an abstract and not anchored to the world-of-
life (Lebenswelt) phenomenological enquiry. Moreover, as claimed by Lascioli (2016), disabilities refer
muchmore to people’s biographies than to their biologies. The reasons onwhich disabilities depend on,
beyond the limits imposed by specific health conditions, include people’s life stories, their specific ways
of functioning in real life contexts, when obstacles or barriers are present, or skills are not sufficiently
supported.
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2. The compromised lived body
Each body is more than a set of anatomical and physical structures: just as it is impossible to grasp the
sense of a gesture starting from the sum of muscle movements, it is not possible to appreciate the exis-
tential scope of the ‘being-body’ by analysing the sum of functions and abilities (Merleau-Ponty, 2005)
exclusively. The body is a unity of meaning, an active producer of meaning in contexts (Reynolds,
2017b). This statement is in profound contrast with the so-called “Cartesian” approach, that is, with
strictly materialistic interpretations of disability that ignore the crucial aspects of embodied existence.
The models of empirical and medical thought reduce the body to its objective status and disability to
the body’s damage (Abrams, 2016). The ontological implications of the “body as fact” are tragic: the
experiences of the body (Leib) are eliminated, and only the symptoms of the body exist (Körper) (Ben-
delow&Williams, 1995). This trend entails the danger of objectification of the body as a thing without
intentionality and intersubjectivity (Csordas, 1994; Wehrle, 2019) andmakes us miss “the opportunity
to add sentience and sensibility to our notions of self and person, and to insert an added dimension
of materiality to our notions of culture and history” (Csordas, 1994, p. 4). The body has its primacy
(Merleau-Ponty, 2005; Wehrle, 2019), as through it, people have access to the world (Lyon & Barbalet,
1994). Our perception of everyday reality depends on a “lived body” (Bendelow&Williams, 1995; Iori,
2006), that is, a body that simultaneously experiences and signifies the world (Merleau-Ponty, 2005).
The story of Professor Toombs opens to a vivid understanding ofwhatmeans disability (in this case,
an acquired one) for the lived body. The Toombs’ interest in the phenomenology of disability (1995)
started from experiencing the disease-related consequences: she was diagnosedwithmultiple sclerosis at
the age of 30. Multiple sclerosis is a disease that progressively disables the central nervous system, erodes
typical functionings, sometimes temporarily, sometimes definitively. She declares:
As an embodied subject, I do not experience my body primarily as an object among other
objects of the world. Rather than being an object for me-as subject, my body as I live it
represents my particular point of view on the world. I am embodied not in the sense that I
have a body—as I have an automobile, a house, or a pet—but in the sense that I exist or live
my body (Toombs, 1992). In this respect the lived body is not the objective, physiological
body that can be seen by others (or examined by means of various medical technologies)
but, rather, the body that is the vehicle for seeing. Furthermore, the lived body is the basic
scheme of orientation, the center of one’s system of coordinates. I experience myself as the
Here over against which everything else is There. As orientational locus in the world, my
body both orients me to the world around by means of my senses and positions the world
in accord with my bodily placement and actions (Toombs, 1995, pp. 10–11).
The body guides people in the world, through the senses, and makes it the centre of the existential
possibilities: in fact, objects present themselves as invitations to actions. Moreover, the spaces are not
only neutral but rather mark the range of possible intentions and feasible activities. Toombs (1995) ex-
plains this concept by analysing how her body thematized the “restrictive potentiality” of space while
losing mobility due to the disease: reaching a place, for example, by experiencing motor disorders, gen-
erates a profound disturbance in the lived body. If for the able people, moving opens the space to the
body, not so for those with a disability.
Permanent loss of function represents amodification of the existential possibilities inherent
in the lived body. The lived body manifests one’s being-in-the-world not only as orienta-
tional and intentional locus but in the sense that distinct bodily patterns (walking, talking,
gesturing) express a unique corporeal style, a certain bodily bearing that identifies the lived
body as peculiarly me. Motor disorders transform corporeal style. New patterns of move-
ment are experienced as unfamiliar, unrecognizable. (Toombs, 1995, p. 16)
For people with physical disabilities, common objects may become incredibly resistant (Toombs,
1995; Wehrle, 2019). In the case of acquired physical disability, as body functionings change, it is nec-
essary to develop novel or alternative ways of interacting with objects. In this sense, the participation
in the world is tiring and may generate a sense of exhaustion which Toombs calls “existential fatigue”
https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.1825-8670/10620 61
Phenomenology and Physical Disability Encyclopaideia. Vol.24 n.56 (2020)
(Toombs, 1995). Implementing (personal, professional, social) purposes requires not only physical abil-
ities but, above all, an exercise of will. When a constant effort is needed to perform the simplest tasks
(getting out of bed, getting dressed, taking a shower, taking a trip), there is a strong urge to withdraw, to
cease doing what is required. Consequently, physical disability exerts a centripetal force towards social
isolation: the person with disabilities is strongly tempted to reduce commitments in and for the world.
Toombs (1995) claimed to have reached this awareness:
whenever I attend stand-up gatherings such as receptions. In my wheelchair I am approx-
imately three and a half feet tall and the conversation takes place above my head. When
speaking to a standing person, I must look up at them and they down to me. This gives me
the ridiculous sense of being a child again surrounded by very tall adults (Toombs, 1995,
p. 17).
In a culture that certainly does not contemplate the physical difference and dependence of peo-
ple but, on the contrary, applauds normality and autonomy, according to Toombs (1995), the shame
(Sartre, 2014) of not being “normate” like the others (Goffman, 1963; Murphy 1987; Toombs, 1995;
Wehrle, 2018) emerges. A further autobiographical example of another phenomenologist is in Paterson
and Hughes (1999). One of the articles’ authors has cerebral palsy. He tells:
A delivery person arrived with a package and said (when I opened the door) ‘Oh, is your
mum not in.’ She obviously thought that I wasn’ t a ‘responsible adult’ and, therefore, not
eligible to participate in the partnership required to complete her task. It is highly unlikely
that she would have arrived at such a conclusion had I been a non-disabled person in their
late twenties (Paterson &Hughes, 1999, p. 606).
This shame connotes the existence of non-normate bodies, not only in terms of lived space and
identity but also as regards the individual relationship with time (Toombs, 1990; 1995; Wehrle, 2019).
As the objects of the world are materials for the personal identity purposes and space is an invitation
to actions and a movement towards, so time is made of promises (de Warren, 2017) as it is typically
experienced as a “gearing towards the future” (Toombs, 1995, p. 19). We usually act in the present in
light of anticipations of what will come, with objectives relating to future possibilities. Those who live
in a compromised body experience an interruption of time-future.
[…] temporal experiencing changes in the sense that the sheer physical demands of impaired
embodiment ground one in the presentmoment, requiring a disproportionate attention to
thehere andnow. One is forced to concentrate on the presentmoment and the present activ-
ity rather than focusing on the next moment. Mundane tasks take much longer than they
did prior to the change in abilities. For instance, when habitual movements are disrupted,
themost ordinary activities such as getting out of bed, rising from a chair, getting in and out
of the shower, knotting a tie, undoing a button, demand unusual exertion, intense concen-
tration, and an untoward amount of time. (Think, for example, of the difference between
the time and effort required to tie one’s shoelaces using one, as opposed to both, hands
— especially if one is right-handed and only able to use the left hand to perform the task.)
In this respect persons with disabilities find themselves “out of synch” with those whose
physical capacities have not changed. This temporal disparity is not insignificant in terms
of relations with others (Toombs, 1995, pp. 19–20).
This change in the relationship with the time-future influences the ways of giving meaning to one’s
identity: in particular, the sense of what is possible in one’s life changes (Toombs, 1995).
3. Intersubjectivity for non-normate bodies
According to a phenomenological approach, therefore, the loss of mobility changes one’s experience of
space, alters the taken-for-granted awareness of (and interaction with) objects, compromises body iden-
tity, influences relationships with others and generates a change in experiencing time. In this context,
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phenomenological studies underline a second aspect of the embodied dimension of disability: social
influence (Hughes & Paterson, 1997; Paterson & Hughes 1999; Turner 1992). Merleau-Ponty (2005)
argues that consciousness can never be objectified as an ill or disable one. So if the person with disabil-
ities complains or is aware of her/his disability, this is possible only through comparison with others
(with the world of the able persons, with their spatial, bodily and cultural norms), or when they adopt
a statistical-objective vision of themselves (Reynolds, 2017b). Abrams (2016), conducting a critical and
interdisciplinary project around disability, called “disabled phenomenology,” defines the person with a
disability as “organized” from a cultural point of view: a structural intercorporeity inscribed the body
(Martiny, 2015).
The majority of the available literature on disability addresses the body within an interactionist per-
spective. Such an approach does not offer phenomenologically-oriented descriptions of the discrimina-
tion experienced by disabled bodies compared to the able ones (Abberley, 1987; Paterson & Hughes,
1999). Phenomenological research should address, in this context, how society structurally disables
people with disabilities rather than studying the effects of social action on individuals since there is
a risk of representing the compromised body as a passive recipient of social forces (Abberley, 1987).
According to Turner (2001) and Abrams (2016), the bio-psycho-social model itself, promoted by the
World Health Organization (WHO, 2001), would involve the distinctions between biological/social,
impairment/disability, body/society, medicine/politics, theory/emancipation, pain/oppression, typical
of a neo-Cartesian thought (Abrams, 2016). If the dichotomies are useful for didactic and commu-
nicative reasons, using them as a decisional, ethical, educational and political basis, risks misleading the
recognition of the real experience of compromised bodies (Martiny, 2015).
In “Disability studies and phenomenology. The carnal politics of everyday life” Paterson andHughes
(1999) emphasize that the body is agency and activity. This perspective is the phenomenological basis
for understanding, beyond all interactionism, the structure of social disabling (and oppression) of com-
promised bodies. It is in the links of the impossibility of being protagonists of the self in the social world
that Paterson and Hughes (1999) foresee forms of bodily, carnal oppression (Abrams, 2016).
Accordingly, Leder’s concept of “body dys-appearance” (1990) is quite explicative. It refers not only
to the non-appearance or disappearance of the body but also the impossibility of the bodily appearing
for structural reasons (Leder, 1990). Leder claims that the body disappears behind any daily routine. Pa-
terson andHughes, applying this concept to the daily life of bodies with disabilities, reflect how, within
the interplay with able bodies, they are physically present and absent at the same time (Kattari, Olzman,
&Hanna, 2018). For example, concerning norms of communication, which are socially defined by the
able bodies, people with language impairment tend to avoid participation in all those daily interactions
of the Lebenswelt: the body with disability disappears, both in functional and aesthetic terms (Paterson
& Hughes, 1999). In Paterson and Hughes (1999), an episode (one of the two authors, as mentioned,
due to cerebral palsy experiences a language disability) is reported in the first person concerning a rather
ordinary communicative practice.
The following story is a good example of how carnally informed orders of time work to
exclude me from opportunities to communicate. I was in a lift with a stranger when she
began asking questions about university. It was an impossible situation because I realised
that I would have no time to speak before one of us would reach our destination and have
to exit the lift. The opportunity to communicate was constrained not only by the traveling
time of the lift, but because the duration norm of this particular communication was not
commensurate with my carnal needs. I did not enter the conversation because it would be
cut short or result in one or both of us missing our floor, or worse still, the communication
may have ended in the ignominious situation in which the doors have to be kept open by
manual means, thus eliciting the petulant disapproval of other users for whom the lift is
a vehicle which operates within a very strict and mechanical time-frame. Such outcomes
would stray outside the conventions of communication and so I am policed by these con-
ventions into an unsatisfactory interaction. My options are reduced to a smile or a nod of
the head, and I am ‘reminded’ of my body (Paterson &Hughes, 1999, p. 606).
Disability as dis-appearance, therefore, is not an intracorporeal phenomenon, but an inter-corporeal
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one, as it is related to forms of relationship with others. This “out-of-the-norm” existence leads to self-
representation as presence-as-alien-being-in-the-world (Paterson & Hughes, 1999). The compromised
body disappears in the context of intercorporeity and intersubjectivity because it is not recognized as an
active agent within the physical, cultural and social world (Kattari, Olzman, & Hanna, 2018; Wehrle,
2017).
From a phenomenological point of view, the world is embodied because it is our purposes and
“projects” that make the world what it is (Hughes & Paterson, 1997; Paterson & Hughes, 1999). Ev-
ery person who is excluded and cannot make a contribution to the creation of the social world cannot
find a meaningful place in it. The first social oppression is, therefore, the exclusion from the shared
project of a world-together-with-others. Here the compromised body “disappears” (Leder, 1990) be-
cause able bodies dominate the information that animates the world (Paterson & Hughes, 1999). As
in the experience of Toombs (1995), a person with a motor disability encounters disabling obstacles be-
cause the material data of non-able bodies have not been taken into account in materially creating the
world. “Exclusion is everywhere, and each time it is experienced, it is experienced in the form of carnal
self-recognition or ‘dys-appearance’ ” (Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 604, t.d.a.). The events told previ-
ously show that there are, therefore, implicit structural rules emerging from inter-corporeal interactions
as a product of the embodied needs of able people.
These daily “codes of conduct” (Paterson & Hughes, 1999), while favouring the existential project
of able bodies, open the field to the oppression for people with disabilities. As discussed above, the
compromised body perceives and knows time and space in a different way and objects become particu-
larly resistant to personal projects. Moreover, oppression and prejudice are embodied in relationships
with others and become part of the daily life experience. According to Paterson and Hughes (1999),
oppression is not to be understood as an abstract structure. It is sensed by the flesh, whenever the body
“disappears.”
In their autobiographical accounts, Toombs (1995), Paterson and Hughes (1999) reveal an essen-
tial element of the intersubjective experience of disability: the daily reality of condescension which is
part of the social “dys-appearance” structure. Because the compromised body is considered dependent
and perceived as having deficit and diversity, people with physical disabilities are often excluded from
social responsibilities: “they are a palpable denial of ‘social competence’ based on a knee-jerk aesthetic
judgement” (Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 606). This judgement relies on reactions to the compro-
mised, non-normate body. In particular, condescension results in perceiving compromised bodies such
as those of eternal children. This form of prejudice, one of the most common among others that can be
highlighted (Lascioli, 2016), impacts the educational relationship, as it depends on the intention of the
educator.
As ethical beliefs have become frequently aestheticized in the postmodern world (Maffesoli, 1996)
‘the tyrannies of perfection’ (Paterson&Hughes, 1999, p. 607) play a central role in shaping intercorpo-
ral encounters. Besides, social competence is conferred on those bodies that have a performance accord-
ing to standard rules. Social competence of people with disabilities disappears not only because their
body is compromised but also because the norms that declare a socially competent person are defined
on the basis of what able bodies can do.
Limiting the exclusion of people with disabilities from sociality involves rethinking their participa-
tion in the Lebenswelt. Expecting that people with disabilities normalize to the standard means exclud-
ing their possible contribution to society and making the Lebenswelt increasingly alien to them. Phe-
nomenology seeks, in this context, to problematize these “normed” dynamics (Wehrle, 2018) which
provide the base for the ableistic prejudices (Kattari, Olzman, & Hanna, 2018). It is crucial to reverse
the hegemony of normate bodies by raising awareness about disability issues. Consequently, alternative
ways of thinking about non-normate bodies may make information to create a shared world emerge
(Davis, 1995).
4. Concluding remarks
This article shows how disability shapes the bodily experience (space, time, relationship with the self,
with others and with things) and the compromised and non-normate body should be considered the
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intentional locus from which to start a phenomenological understanding of disability. Disability is not
a problem of medicine and rehabilitation exclusively. It is an identity issue and consequently, an educa-
tional and political problem (Paterson &Hughes, 1999). According to Leder (1990), the environment
produces a vivid, but unwanted, awareness of one’s compromised body. The body undergoes “dys-
appearance” which is not biological but social and political. According to Paterson andHughes (1999),
when prejudices are encountered in the behaviour or attitudes of others, the compromised body “dis-
appears,” just as it disappears in the face of embodied (and socially produced) norms for able bodies.
The exclusion and interruption of communication, in the case shown, are therefore not referable to
the inability (or deficit) of a person with disabilities but should be credited to the norms of “normal”
communication, which are a priori hostile to non-normate forms of physicality. Just as, compared to
the changed character of motor skills of Toombs (1995), it is essential to recognize that those people
who “negotiate” space in a wheelchair live in a world that is designed for those who can stand (Toombs,
1995). These forms of lived body are therefore doubly compromised: compromised because they are
not-normate and compromised because they disappear.
Phenomenology brings out oppression and disadvantage as “ostracism from opportunities to partic-
ipate in the everyday, mundane, sensate minutiae of the lifeworld” (Paterson & Hughes, 1999, p. 605)
and questions how the body is socially ordered in the “somatic society” (Turner, 1992). Mind and body
are not valid categories for describing the matter of embodied human existence (Abrams, 2016). Mak-
ing reflection on disability dependent on these Cartesian categories ignores the fact that somatic society
has eliminated themodernist separation of the body frompolitics. The body is not a passive component
in politics but the place of exclusion, and therefore of factual oppression (Paterson & Hughes, 1999).
Supporting the desire to be active citizens of people with physical disabilities means creating a world in
which their bodies do not “disappear.”
https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.1825-8670/10620 65
Phenomenology and Physical Disability Encyclopaideia. Vol.24 n.56 (2020)
References
Abberley, P. (1987). The concept of oppression and the development of a social theory of disability.
Disability, Handicap & Society, 2, 5–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/02674648766780021
Abrams, T. (2016). Cartesian dualism and disabled phenomenology. Scandinavian Journal of Disabil-
ity Research, 18(2), 118–128. https://doi.org/10.1080/15017419.2014.995219
Bendelow, G., &Williams, S. (1995). Transcending the dualisms: towards a sociology of pain. Sociology
of Health & Illness, 17, 139–165. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9566.ep10933376
Bertolini, P. (2003). Educazione e politica. Milano: Raffaello Cortina.
Campbell, F. K. (2009). Contours of Ableism: The Production of Disability and Abledness. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230245181
Castañeda, R., & Peters, M. L. (2000). Ableism. InM. Adams, W. J. Blumenfled, R. Castañeda, H. W.
Hackman, M. L. Peters, & X. Zúñiga (Eds.), Readings for diversity and social justice (pp. 319–323).
New York: Routledge.
Csordas, T. J. (1994). Introduction: the body as representation and being-in-theworld. InT. J. Csordas
(Ed.),Embodiment andExperience. The existential ground of culture and self (pp. 1–26). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Davis, L. J. (1995). Enforcing Normalcy: disability, deafness and the body. London: Verso.
de Warren, N. (2017). Husserl e la promessa del tempo. La soggettività nella fenomenologia trascenden-
tale. Pisa: Edizioni ETS.
Goffman, E. (1963). Stigma: Notes on the management of spoiled identity. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Pren-
tice Hall.
Hughes, B., & Paterson, K. (1997). The social model of disability and the disappearing body: to-
wards a sociology of impairment. Disability and Society, 12(3), 325–340. https://doi.org/10.1080/
09687599727209
Iori, V. (2006). Nei sentieri dell’esistere. Spazio, tempo, corpo nei processi formativi. Trento: Erickson.
Kattari, S. K., Olzman, M., & Hanna, M. D. (2018). “You Look Fine!”: Ableist Experiences by People
With Invisible Disabilities. Affilia, 33(4), 477–492. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886109918778073
Lascioli, A. (2011). Handicap e pregiudizio. Le radici culturali. Milano: FrancoAngeli.
Lascioli, A. (2016). Prejudice andDisability… Educating the Looking. Italian Journal of Special Educa-
tion for Inclusion, IV (2), 14–30.
Leder, D. (1990). The Absent Body. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Lyon,M.L.,&Barbalet, J.M. (1994). Society’s Body: Emotion and the ‘Somatization’ of SocialTheory.
InT. J.Csordas (Ed.),Embodiment andExperience. The existential ground of culture and self (pp. 48–
67). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Maffesoli, M. (1996). The Time of the Tribes. London: Sage.
Martiny, K.M. (2015). How to develop a phenomenologicalmodel of disability. Medicine, HealthCare
and Philosophy, 18: 553–565. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-015-9625-x
Merleau-Ponty,M. (2005). Fenomenologia della percezione. Milano: Bompiani (ed. or. Phénomenologie
de la perception. Paris: Gallimard, 1945).
https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.1825-8670/10620 66
Phenomenology and Physical Disability Encyclopaideia. Vol.24 n.56 (2020)
Murphy, R. (1987). The body silent. New York: Henry Holt.
Paterson, K., &Hughes, B. (1999). Disability studies and phenomenology. The carnal politics of every-
day life. Disability and Society, 14, 597–610. https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599925966
Reynolds, J. M. (2017a). ‘I’d Rather Be Dead than Disabled’ — The Ableist Conflation and the Mean-
ings of Disability. Review of Communication, 17(3), 149–163. https://doi.org/10.1080/15358593.
2017.1331255
Reynolds, J. M. (2017b). Merleau-Ponty, World-Creating Blindness, and the Phenomenology of Non-
Normate Bodies. Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies Concerning Merleau-Ponty’s Thought,
19, 419–434. https://doi.org/10.5840/chiasmi20171934
Sartre, J. P. (2014). L’essere e il Nulla. Milano: Il Saggiatore (ed. or. L’Être et le Néant: Essai d’ontologie
phénoménologique, Paris: Gallimard, 1943).
Smith, l., Foley, P. F., & Chaney, M. P. (2008). Addressing Classism, Ableism, and Heterosexism
in Counselor Education. Journal of Counseling & Development, 86, 303–309. https://doi.org/10.
1002/j.1556-6678.2008.tb00513.x
Toombs, S. K. (1990). The temporality of illness: Four levels of experience. Theoretical Medicine, 11,
227–241. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00489832
Toombs, S. K. (1992). The meaning of illness: A phenomenological account of the different perspectives of
physician and patient. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-
011-2630-4
Toombs, S. K. (1995). The Lived Experience of Disability. Human Studies, 18(1), 9–23. https://doi.
org/10.1007/BF01322837
Turner, B. (1992). Regulating Bodies: essays in medical sociology. London: Routledge.
Turner, B. (2001). Disability and the sociology of the body. In G. L. Albrecht, K. D. Seelman & M.
Bury (Eds.), Handbook of Disabilities Studies (pp. 252–266). London: Routledge. https://doi.org/
10.4135/9781412976251.n10
Wehrle, M. (2017). The Normative Body and the Embodiment of Norms. Yearbook for Eastern and
Western Philosophy, 2017(2), pp. 323–337. https://doi.org/10.1515/yewph-2017-0023
Wehrle, M. (2019). Being a body and having a body. The twofold temporality of embodied intention-
ality. Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences, 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-019-09610-z
World Health Organization. (2001). International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and
Health. Geneva: WHO.
https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.1825-8670/10620 67
